is an open problem largely because of two main challenges. Not only does it capture the difficulty of the compound wiretap channel (another open problem) as a special case, it also requires that secrecy is ensured with respect to exponentially many possible channel state sequences. This work overcomes the second aforementioned difficulty. To that end, we consider an AVWTC with a type constraint on the allowed state sequences, and derive a single-letter characterization of its correlated-random (CR) assisted semantic-security (SS) capacity. The allowed state sequences are the ones in a typical set around a single constraining type. SS is established by showing that the mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper's observations is negligible even when maximized over all message distributions, choices of state sequences and realizations of the CR-code.
I. INTRODUCTION Modern communication systems usually present an architectural separation between error correction and data encryption. The former is typically realized at the physical layer by transforming the noisy communication channel into a reliable "bit pipe". The data encryption is implemented on top of that by applying cryptographic principles. The cryptographic approach assumes no knowledge on the quality of the eavesdropper's channel and relies solely on restricting the computational power of the eavesdropper. The looming construction of quantum computers (QCs) (some companies have recently reported a working prototype of a QC with over than 1000 qbits), however, would entirely break some important cryptosystems while weakening others. Nonetheless, cryptography remains the main practical tool for protecting data, at least for the time being.
An alternative approach to secure communication is the so-called physical layer security, a concept that dates back to Wyner's celebrated paper on the wiretap channel (WTC) [1] . Essentially, Wyner's main idea was to exploit the noise of the communication channel along with proper physical layer coding to guarantee secrecy against a computationallyunlimited eavesdropper. Protection against such an eavesdropper, however, comes at a price of assuming that the eavesdropper's channel is perfectly known to the legitimate parties and stays fixed during the transmission. Many of the information-theoretic secrecy results that followed relied on extending Wyner's ideas, and therefore, are derived under the same hypothesis. Much of the critique by the cryptographic community towards information-theoretic security is aimed exactly at that assumption.
Practical systems suffer from limited channel state information (CSI) due to inaccuracies in the channel's estimation process and imperfect feedback. Furthermore, adversarial eavesdroppers will refrain from providing the legitimate parties with any information about their channels to make securing the data even harder. Accordingly, limited CSI (especially about the eavesdropper's channel) must be assumed to successfully model a practical communication system. The model of an arbitrarily varying WTC (AVWTC), that is the focus of this work, does just that. The AVWTC combines the WTC [1] and the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) [2] , [3] . It consists of a collection of discrete-memoryless WTCs indexed by elements in a finite state space. The state at each time instance is chosen in an arbitrary manner and is unknown to the legitimate parties. Being aware of the state space, however, the legitimate users can place the actual channel realization within a certain uncertainty set, which models their limited eavesdropper's CSI.
The challenge presented by the AVWTC is twofold. First, it subsumes the difficulty of the compound WTC (where the channel's state is constant in time), for which a singleletter secrecy-capacity characterization is also an open problem [4] , [5] . A multi-letter description of the compound WTC's secrecy-capacity was found in [5] . It is, however, currently unknown how to single-letterize this expression. The underlying gap is that while reliability must be ensured with respect to the worst main channel, security is measured under the best eavesdropper channel; a single channel state under which these extremes simultaneously materialize, however, does not necessarily exist. The second difficulty concerning AVWTCs is that security must be ensured under all possible state sequences, whose number grows exponentially with the blocklength. To get single-letter results, the latter is usually dealt with by assuming the existence of a best channel to the eavesdropper and establishing secrecy with respect to that channel only (see, e.g., [6] , [7] ). Yet, the only singleletter secrecy-capacity characterization for an AVWTC that the authors are aware of assumes even more [6, Theorem 4] . On top of the existence of such a best channel, the derivation of [6, Theorem 4 ] also relies on the AVWTC being strongly-degraded and having independent (main channel and eavesdropper channel) states.
This work gives a full solution to the second difficulty. We consider a general AVWTC with a type constraint on the allowed state sequences, and establish in Theorem 1 a singleletter characterization of its CR-assisted semantic-security (SS) capacity. The type constraint essentially means that the viable state sequences are only the ones of the prescribed type. However, since a fixed distribution (even if rational) is not a valid type for all blocklengths, we define achievability by allowing the empirical distribution of the state sequences to be within a small gap from the type. By doing so, the type constrained AVWTC is well defined for all blocklengths. As a consequence, our uncertainty set is a typical set around the allowed type, which still contains exponentially many state sequences. The structure of the CR-assisted SS-capacity formula suggests that the legitimate users effectively see the averaged channel (i.e., the expectation of the main channels with respect to the type) while security must be ensured versus an eavesdropper with perfect CSI. A specific instance of a type constrained AVWTC that is related to binary symmetric -binary erasure (BS-BE) WTC that was studied in [8] is used to visualize the result.
The results are derived while adopting the prescription of [9] to replace the commonly used strong secrecy metric with the stricter SS metric. The authors of [9] advocate SS as the new standard for information-theoretic security, because from a cryptographic point of view, strong secrecy is insufficient to provide security of applications. Its main drawback lies in the assumption that the message is random and uniformly distributed, as real-life messages are neither (messages may be files, votes or any type of structured data, often with low entropy). In turn, the uniformly distributed message makes the strong secrecy metric an average quantity, that might converge even when many 1 of the messages are actually not secured. Furthermore, to eliminate the benefit of CR for secrecy purposes, we demand that SS holds for each realization of the CR (a similar approach was taken in [10] with respect to the strong secrecy metric). This essentially means that the transmission is semantically-secure even if the choice of the state sequence depends on the realization of the CR.
To prove our coding theorem for the type constrained AVWTC (i.e., the main result in Theorem 1), we provide both a stronger achievability and a stronger converse than is actually required. The broader achievability claim, found in Theorem 2, is a lower bound on the CR-assisted SS-capacity of an AVWTC with state sequences constrained by any convex and closed set of state PMFs. This bound shows that the best 1 The number of unsecured messages may even grow exponentially with the blocklength, while still having a converging strong secrecy metric. known achievable single-letter secrecy rates for a similarly constrained compound WTC [4] , [5] can be achieved also in the AVWTC. The converse of Theorem 1 is a consequence of Theorem 3 that states an upper bound on CR-assisted SS-capacity of an AVWTC with state sequences from any collection of type-classes. The upper bound is of a max-inf form, i.e., first an infimum over the constraint set is taken, and then the result is maximized over the input distributions. When specializing the result to the aforementioned compound WTC, it produces an upper bound that improves upon the previously best known single-letter upper bound for this setting [4, Theorem 2] . The latter result has a min-max structure, while our upper bound has a max-min form.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND DEFINITIONS
We use notation from [11, Section II] . In particular, the set of all probability mass functions (PMFs) on a finite set is denoted by ( ). The type x of a sequence x ∈ is
The subset of ( ) that contains all possible types of sequences x ∈ is denoted by ( ). For ∈ ( ), the type-class
} is denoted by . We use ( ) to denote the set of letter-typical sequences with respect to the PMF ∈ ( ) and the non-negative number defined by
where 1 is the indicator function on the event . Let , , and be finite sets. A discrete-memoryless (DM) arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWTC), as illustrated in Fig. 1 , is defined by a pair ( , ) of families of channels
, from to and , respectively. Thus, ∈ denotes the state of the channels and can be interpreted as an index identifying a particular pair ( , ) ∈ × . The -th extension of the channel laws for input x ∈ and outputs y ∈ and z ∈ , under the state sequence s ∈ are
( | ) and 
where ∈ (ℳ). The performance of on the type constrained AVWTC ( , , ) is evaluated in terms of its rate 1 log , the maximal decoding error probability and the SS-metric. Reliability and security must be ensured with respect to every allowed constrained state sequence.
Definition 2 (Message Error Probability) Let be an uncorrelated ( , )-code for the AVWTC ( , ). For any ∈ ℳ and s ∈
, let the error probability in decoding under the state sequence s be 
where the subscript denotes that the mutual information term is taken with respect to the marginal PMF ( ,s) ,Zs of (2). For any ⊆ ( ), the SS metric with respect to and We proceed with defining correlated random (CR) codes, their associated maximal error probability and SS-metric, CRassisted achievability and CR-assisted secrecy-capacity.
Definition 4 (CR Code, Error Probability and SS Metric)
], and a PMF ∈ (Γ ). For any ∈ ℳ and s ∈ , the associated error probability with respect to ℂ is
The maximal error probability and SS-metric of ℂ for the -constrained AVWTC ( , , ) are defined as 
is not a valid type for all blocklengths, the definitions of the type constrained performance metrics and its achievability uses a relaxation parameter. For any ∈ ( ) and > 0, let
} . The definitions of the error probability and the SS-metric for the type constrained AVWTC repeat those from Definition 4 with ( ) instead of . The CR-assisted SS-capacity R ( , , ) of the type constrained AVWTC is defined as
III. SINGLE-LETTER CR-CAPACITY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Our main result is a single-letter characterization of the CRassisted SS-capacity R ( , , ) of the type constrained AVWTC ( , , ), for any ∈ ( ). To the best of our knowledge, the only single-letter characterization of a secrecy-capacity of an AVWTC outside the current work [6, Theorem 4 ] is under the following assumptions: (i) security under the weak secrecy metric (as shown in [10, Corollary 1] an upgrade to strong secrecy under the same conditions (ii)-(iv) is possible); (ii) the state space decomposes as = × , where ∈ and ∈ are the states of the main AVC and of the AVC to the eavesdropper, respectively; (iii) the eavesdroppers output is a degraded version of the output of the main AVC under any pair of state, i.e., − − forms a Markov chain, for all ( , ) ∈ × ; (iv) there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper, i.e., the exists ★ ∈ such that − ★ − forms a Markov chain, for all ∈ .
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Our single-letter CR-capacity characterization is derived without assuming any of the above, while upgrading the secrecy metric to SS.
Theorem 1 (AVWTC CR-Assisted SS-Capacity) For any ∈ ( ), the CR-assisted SS-capacity of the type constrained AVWTC
where the mutual information terms are calculated with respect to a joint PMF
, , ) ∈ × × × , and | | ≤ | |.
Theorem 1 is an outcome of two other stronger results that state a lower and upper bound on the CR-assisted SS-capacity of a general -constrained AVWTC. These bounds match when specialized to the type constrained scenario. The lower and upper bounds are given in Theorem 2 and 3, respectively. The derivation of Theorem 1 from Theorems 2 and 3 mostly relies on standard continuity of mutual information arguments and is omitted due to space limitations (see [11, for the details).
Remark 5 (SS-Capacity Interpretation) The characterization of the CR-assisted SS-capacity R ( , ,
) in (9) has the common structure of two subtracted mutual information terms. The We have the following lower bound on the CR-assisted SScapacity of a -constrained AVWTC. The proof of Theorem 2 relies on the approach from [12] for the error probability analysis of a CR-code over a family of codes that grows doubly-exponentially with the blocklength. Since this family of codes is too large to establish SS in the sense of (7b), we use the Chernoff bound to show that a sub-family with no more than polynomially many codes is sufficient for reliability. Having that, the double-exponential decay that [11, Lemma 1] provides is leveraged to establish SS over the reduced CR-code. The fact that reliability and security must hold with respect to the worst case choice in is expressed in the minimization of ( ; ) over all (1) PMFs and the maximization of ( ; | ) over (2) . The interested reader is referred to the Section V of the full version of this work [11] for the proof of Theorem 2. Although no converse proof accompanies Theorem 2, the lower bound it states is stronger than existing single-letter achievability results in the literature as it assumes no 'best channel to the eavesdropper', doesn't impose any specific structure on the state space, and ensures SS. [4, Theorem 1] and [5, Theorem ] 
Theorem 2 (Achievability with 퓠-constrained States) For any convex and closed ⊆ ( ), the CR-assisted SS-capacity of the -constrained AVWTC ( , , ) is lower bounded as
R ( , , ) ≥ max , [ min (1) ∈ ( ; ) − max
Remark 6 (Relation to Compound WTCs)

).
A general upper bound on the CR-assisted SS-capacity of a -constrained AVWTC is stated next. To state the result, for any countable alphabet we defined ℚ ( ) as the set of rational PMFs on . Namely,
where ℚ is the set of all rational numbers. 
Theorem 3 (Upper Bound with 퓠-constrained States) For any ⊆ ( ), the CR-assisted SS-capacity of the -constrained AVWTC ( , , ) is upper bounded as
The max-inf structure of the RHS of (12) calls for a derivation that is uniform in ∈ . The infimum is taken over ∩ ℚ ( ) (rather than over ) because the proof effectively considers only the rational distributions in while leveraging the monotonicity of the CR-assisted SS-capacity with respect to (see Remark 4) . The proof shows that for each ∈ ∩ ℚ ( ), reliability and SS under a type constraint imply similar performance for the same channel but where the state sequence is i.i.d. according to . The main difficulty is in showing that even when transmitting over a DMC obtained by averaging the ∈ with respect to , the normalized equivocation of the message given the output sequence at the legitimate user is still small. This is established via a novel argument based on distribution coupling.
Remark 7 (Time-Sharing Random Variable )
The conditioning on in the RHS of (12) [13] ). Indeed, as shown in [5] , the upper bound from [4] 
, where ⊕ denotes the modulo 2 addition. For the eavesdropper, let 0 : → ( ) be a noiseless channel, while 1 : → ( ) outputs the symbol ? with probability 1. Namely,
Finally, we introduce a type constraint 1 , 2 = and ∈ [0, 1]. Denote the CR-assisted SScapacity of this AVWTC by R ( , ).
By Theorem 1, The CR-assisted SS-capacity is
where the mutual information terms are calculated with respect to the joint distribution
where (a) is because =? whenever 2 = 1 (thus nullifying the second mutual information term), while given on 2 = 0, we have = and the conditioning is removed due to the independence of 2 and ( , ). Consequently, (14) reduces to Remark 5) . Noting that the DMC 1 is a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability (BSC( )), we have that R ( , ) is the secrecy-capacity of BS-BE WTC with a BSC( ) between the legitimate users and a binary erasure channel with erasure probability (BEC( )) to the eavesdropper [8] . (1) = when = 0.1 is fixed. The curves are plotted by parametrizing the joint PMF of the binary random variables and and spanning over the possible probability values. As mentioned before, R ( , ) is also the secrecy-capacity of a BS-BE WTC, which was studied in [8] . In that work it was shown that the secrecy-capacity is zero if < 4 (1 − ). When = 0.1 the threshold value of is 0.36. Indeed, Fig.  2 (b) reveals that R (0.1, ) = 0 for any < 0.36. Beyond 0.36, the SS-capacity monotonically increases with , since the larger the probability of an erasure, the worse the channel to the eavesdropper is. From the opposite perspective, a fixed ( 1 , 2 ) , which gives a zero SS-capacity in that region in Fig. 2(b) . Also observe that as a function of , R ( , 0.4) grows as the crossover probability approaches the extreme values of 0 or 1.
Remark 9
